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INTRODUCTION
In its broadest sense, ‘economism’ is the claim that decision makers and theorists have 
overestimated the contribution that the economic realm can make to policy making. 
Given a society's limited resources, public policy often requires taking decisions among 
conflicting desires and goals. How best to make such choices - the 'allocation of scarce 
resources among competing ends' - has troubled analysts for quite some time, and 
economics has been a sought-after discipline to provide guidance in that endeavor. 
Government agencies, unlike private corporations, do not face the danger of bankruptcy 
when implementing a policy that is not efficient and often find their budget constraints 
'softened' (Kornai 1986). While private firms have to minimize their costs due to external 
market pressures exerted upon them, few such pressures exist for government agencies. 
Hence, inefficiency tends to be more severe and prolonged than in the private sector 
(Leibenstein 1966). Given that in some welfare states the allocative sector can be as large 
as half of GDP and that it requires an extensive bureaucracy with a plethora of laws and 
regulations, the quid pro quo question of how most efficiently to organize it is 
undeniably imminent. 
The application of private sector management techniques, discussed in chapters 
VI.3 and VI.6 in this volume, has been heralded as pointing into the right direction. The 
incorporation, privatization, marketization and deregulation of public services and the 
reassigning of policy responsibility from bureaucratic administrators to the most cost-
effective private bidder through 'temporary contracts' were seen as methods to ascertain 
the desired levels of efficiency. They were based on economic evaluation techniques that 
enabled policy makers to identify, measure, value and compare the consequences of 
alternative policy programs.
These economic evaluations can be seen as proceeding through a number of 
stages. First, for any proposal under consideration, including the option of doing 
nothing, a qualitative statement of its expected costs and benefits is to be provided. 
Second, each cost and benefit should be rendered in quantitative form. Third, each 
quantity should be translated into a common currency (usually monetary values). Fourth, 
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the total expected costs or benefits should be calculated. Finally a decision should be 
taken on the basis of which proposal produces the greatest sum of benefits over costs, so 
understood. The first stage seems essential to any rational decision-making process, but 
each further stage is highly contested. 
In this chapter we will address difficulties that these phases give rise to in theory 
and practice. We will do so against the background of the most popular economic 
evaluation technique currently employed in policy making, that of cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA). After setting the scene, in section one, with a brief outline of the meaning of 
economism as a term and concept, section two will explore the issues related to the 
measurement and monetary valuation of the items that are to be included in economic 
evaluations (what we might call the valuation problem). To be sure, if the methodology 
of economic evaluations is not to be arbitrary or fetishistic, some connection between 
the currency of evaluation and human well-being, at least broadly conceived, must be 
established. After all, the monetary value of a good reflects the strength of individuals' 
preferences for that good, which in turn is a measure of the welfare provided by it. 
Implementing this rationale exposes serious weaknesses, however. They must not go 
unnoticed and require comprehensive exploration. Section three will then deal with the 
problem of comparing costs and benefits across lives (what we might call the 
commensurability problem), while section four outlines the issue of how individuals’ 
values as human beings might be overridden by economic evaluations (the intrinsic value 
problem). Although these charges can be brought against any policy domain to a greater 
or lesser degree we will place them into the specific context of healthcare provision and 
environmental regulation so to make the discussion more tangible. In the concluding 
section we will then develop a set of recommendations that we would want economic 
approaches to public policy to follow if the pitfalls of economism are to be avoided.
I. ECONOMISM AS A TERM AND CONCEPT
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Claims of economism can come in two disguises. The first is a psychological account 
about the motivation that drives human action, which is assumed to be predominantly 
spurred by economic motives so to improve one's own material well-being. First 
introduced in this sense by communist intellectuals at the beginning of the 20th century, 
economism was seen as an antipode to class-consciousness, ideology and political 
activity. Sections within the socialist movement were accused, for example, by Lenin 
(1964, 29) and Gramsci (1971, 165) of betraying their common cause because they were 
too happy to settle for better economic terms and conditions on which to sell their labor 
power, found cozy arrangements with capitalist industrialists, and generally refused to 
engage in the more demanding revolutionary struggle to obtain political power. More 
muted instances of this account are still heard today: trade unions are said to direct their 
behavior depending on the extent to which employers are willing to raise salaries for their 
members; and political parties are accused of obtaining funds from pressure groups to 
sponsor the voting campaigns of their candidates - in exchange for which they support 
policies that these economic interests favor and at the expense of satisfying the 
preferences or their constituents.
The second account, which we are henceforth concerned with in this chapter, 
refers to the theoretical foundations on which public policy is and should be built. 
Economism understood in this political theory sense lays blame on public policy for 
delineating economic efficiency as the predominant policy objective; for applying 
elaborate economic tools to identify the policy option best suited to achieve that goal; 
and for relying on the market, or some proxy, as the institution best equipped to set the 
required framework. The policy choices made as a result, so the claim goes, trump, or at 
least reduce, other important values that guide human behavior and that society might 
therefore uphold, such as solidarity, community, equality or friendship (Henderson 
1996).
The emphasis on economic efficiency became particularly noteworthy in the 
1980s, when the new center-right governments that had come into power in the US, the 
UK and Germany started to subject their public expenditures to much more stringent 
economic scrutiny. They saw the expansion of the welfare state in previous decades as 
having had adverse effects on economic efficiency and international competitiveness, 
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which has thus become a source of major economic problems, including declining 
productivity growth and high levels of unemployment (Okun 1975). Hence, governments 
decided to cut public spending and taxes and to reassign responsibility for individual 
well-being from the state to the individual. Investments into public services such as 
health, transport and education dropped dramatically and were kept at low levels for 
many years to come. 
Two decades later many industrialized countries were rewarded in their economic 
policies with substantial increases in output of products and services as well as greater 
international competitiveness. These successes came at a considerable price in terms of 
domestic income distribution however. For although the causal link between high levels 
of equality and low levels of efficiency has been contested as ‘elusive’ (LeGrand 1991, ch. 
3), the two countries most concerned about efficiency and the free market experienced 
above average shifts in income distribution: in the UK, the so-called 'Gini-coefficient', a 
common statistical index in the social sciences to measure diversity and inequality in 
income and wealth within a society, rose from 0.25 in 1979 to 0.35 in 2000, while the US 
saw an increase from 0.36 to 0.43 over the same period (Coudouel and Hentschel, 2000).2
The ramifications of greater inequality and competitive pressure were not only 
felt by the poor and vulnerable. A general dissatisfaction grew among citizens with the 
absence of rewards that they, at least in the long run, anticipated in exchange for the 
sacrifices and hardships they increasingly incurred in daily life. The discontent became 
widespread, uniting individuals with diverse agendas against the ramifications of domestic 
as well as international economic policies. The unprecedented demonstrations the world 
saw at the end of the millennium in Prague, Seattle, Genoa, and Washington among 
others, united the most unlikely bedfellows: farmers complaining about the decline of 
rural communities found themselves standing shoulder-to-shoulder with 'deep ecologists' 
demanding sensible stewardship of the resources and value that nature offered. And 
while feminists decried the absence of the value of household labor in economic 
calculations, religious leaders raged against the portrayal of human beings as intrinsically 
motivated by hedonistic interests. By that time, then, the claim of economism no longer 
emanated from within the political left, as it had done during Marx’s and Lenin’s time,
but cut well across the political left-right spectrum.
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The methodological and philosophical difficulties that we will draw out in this 
chapter will go some way to shed light on the reasons for the public’s discontent with 
economistic policy approaches. A suitable starting point to do so is to examine the 
evaluation method most commonly employed to ensure that desired efficiency levels are 
achieved, that of cost-benefit analysis (CBA).3 CBA enables analysts to exploit a set of 
analytical tools used in economics and econometrics to evaluate project investments and 
policy options and has been made a legal prerequisite in most countries. In the USA, for 
example, a comparison of costs and benefits has been recommended since the Roosevelt 
administration. Executive order 12991, signed by President Reagan in 1981, later codified 
CBA as a requirement for agencies when conducting risk assessments in health, safety 
and environmental regulation (Smith 1984; PCCRA 1997; for the UK: HM Treasury 
1997).
There is a large body of literature available dealing with CBA, some of which 
dates back to the 1920s, when large-scale engineering projects in the US required some 
type of project evaluation. Although CBA is not really a self-contained field of 
economics but sits somewhat uneasily between several scholarly discourses including 
philosophy, psychology and politics (Adler and Posner 2001; Layard and Glaister 2001), 
the central procedures of CBA have been predominantly defined by economists. The 
standard introductory textbook, too, has been written by an economist (Mishan 1972) 
and is now available in its 8th imprint. While the scope of CBA was often confined to 
costs and benefits that accrued to a single enterprise only, Mishan soon demanded that 
CBA be carried out in such a way as to include all known costs, external or internal, and 
be "concerned with the economy as a whole, with the welfare of a defined society, and 
not any smaller part of it" (p. 11).
Appreciating the effects on the welfare of the whole society, however, required of 
policy makers to apply ever greater levels of analytical sophistication so to be able to 
capture the additional dimensions by which societies have come to define said welfare –
such as the environment, health, and safety, to mention but a few. As the remit for 
economic methodologies became therefore ever more expansive, additional problems, at 
operational as well as conceptual level, presented themselves. Sections II to IV will 
outline one of them each. 
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II. THE VALUATION PROBLEM
Economism, we have pointed out, is the charge that a theorist or policy maker has over-
estimated the significance of the economic realm. To accuse followers of CBA of 
economism is, then, to suppose that they have made some sort of mistake in applying 
their economic rationale; most likely one of reductionism, in which some value important 
to societal well-being is either incorrectly reduced to a monetary metric or ignored 
altogether. This is what we might call the valuation problem, and one area in which this 
criticism has been made is the policy domain of environmental regulation. 
When public policy involves decision-making about ecological systems, the prices 
for the natural services and goods required to implement a policy option need to reflect 
the true costs incurred in their creation, not only those that are reflected in market prices. 
Through an analysis of costs and benefits that incorporates these externalities, policy 
makers try to ensure that a certain stock of natural resources can be maintained, 
including the quality of soil, ground and surface water, land biomass, and, possibly, the 
waste-assimilation capacity of the receiving environments (Hanley and Spash, 1993). As 
part of a CBA, the costs and benefits of alternative policy options need to be measured. 
To do so, quantitative relationships between, for example, pollution exposure on the one 
hand and some human or ecological response on the other are needed to estimate the 
marginal change the policy will bring about. 
This can be a substantial endeavor because, contrary to a CBA carried out by a 
firm, public policy decisions have to include the impact not only on a corporate entity 
but on wider society as well. The crucial feature of some of the goods in need of 
valuation is that we care about them - such as clean air and water, the countryside etc. -  
but they are not traded in commercial markets and therefore have no market price. Many 
of nature’s services fall into this category of public goods (Hardin 1982): while they are 
consumed jointly, no one can be excluded from using them (‘non-excludability’), and one 
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person’s use does not limit another’s (‘non-rivalry’ or 'non-divisibility'), at least up to 
some congestion point. Tangible natural resources that are traded in a market represent 
only a small part of the services that nature provides. Our ecosystem, with its abiotic (i.e. 
nonliving) and biotic (living) components such as climate, soils, bacteria, plants and 
animals, provides additional services from which the human population, either directly or 
indirectly, derives benefits. They include raw materials and waste assimilation of course, 
but also entail functions usually not included in CBAs, such as hydrological flows, 
regulation of global temperature, biological control, nutrient cycling, to mention but a 
few.
The reason for their absence is due to problems economists and policy makers 
face with the accurate estimation of the value of these services. In the past decades, 
several attempts have been made to address this issue, and a number of valuation 
techniques have been advanced that examined revealed behavior in a market. The 
intention has been to assign a monetary value to both the stocks of natural assets and 
their use as material inputs and sinks for waste residuals. Most of these methods are only 
applicable to limited contexts and therefore have their particular strengths and 
weaknesses. Such is the case for the ‘Travel Cost Method’, which establishes a 
relationship between the costs individuals are willing to incur to visit resources with 
recreational functions; ‘Hedonic Pricing’ for goods the value of which can be inferred 
from a proxy-good in the market - such as property values indicating the costs of noise 
levels in a given neighborhood; and ‘Opportunity Costs’ where one resource use 
precludes another (for a concise overview see Turner et al. 1994, 114-27). 
A significant advance towards a more universally applicable method was made 
when, from the 1960s onwards, ‘Contingent Valuation’ (CV) was introduced as another 
valuation technique, which was not based on individuals' revealed but on their stated
references. With CV, economists sought to create hypothetical markets for all goods 
traded outside the market system, by asking people what they would pay, if there was a 
market and they had to (Arrow et al. 1992). Contingent Valuation is an umbrella term 
that covers divergent methodological approaches but usually employs surveys to elicit 
respondents’ value for a commodity and their willingness to pay (WTP) for the 
satisfaction of a preference or accept compensation (WTA) for forgoing its satisfaction. 
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With the help of CV, considerations of what policy choice might be in society's overall 
interest can be informed by economic evaluations such as CBA of how these values 
balance up.
These surrogate valuation methods established themselves very quickly in the 
academic and policy-making communities. They constituted a paradigm shift in 
economic theory, away from the study of actors’ revealed preferences in the market 
(Robbins 1932) towards the study of stated preferences and human behavior in 
experimental settings. CV experienced continuous methodological improvements 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s reaching ever higher levels of sophistication and 
purported objectivity. Leading environmental economists such as Pearce (1993) in the 
UK and Kneese (1984) in the US have endorsed the suitability of this approach for 
public policy.
In the mid 1990s a team of researchers around Robert Costanza was then able to 
consolidate more than one hundred of such CV analyses so to produce the most 
comprehensive study to date on the value of nature (Costanza et al. 1997). They 
estimated that the annual value of seventeen different ecosystem services is equivalent to 
US$33 trillion, with nutrient cycling (17,075bn) and waste treatment (2,227bn) at the top 
of the price list. The methods' success was not only confined to academic studies such as 
Costanza's, however. In the US, they also became a legally binding procedure on which, 
for example, compensation payments for the environmental damage inflicted by the 1989 
Exxon Valdez tanker catastrophe were based. But as sophistication advanced, so did the 
controversies and debates surrounding the method, some themes of which are worth 
summarizing here. 
First, there is the criticism advanced, for example, by Diamond and Hausman 
(1993) that WTP is an inadequate proxy for market prices because of the ambiguity and 
limited reliability of the stated preferences used in CV, as opposed to those revealed in a 
market. A price is the economic value beyond which people would cease to demand a 
good and spend their money on some other source of satisfaction instead. In an actual 
market, consumers’ willingness and financial constraints sets the price at which goods are 
exchanged in such a way. In a CV setting this is not necessarily the case. The US$33 
trillion price tag that Costanza et al. have put on nature does not fulfill this requirement. 
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If these ecosystem services were actually be paid for, the global price system would be 
very different from what it is today. The implication of Constanza’s analysis is that, in 
trying to replace these services, global GDP, which currently stands at US$18 trillion, 
would need to increase by a further US$33 trillion, without immediate increase in 
material possessions that individuals would be able to experience qualitatively or 
quantitatively in exchange for the higher prices that they would have had to pay. 
This objection has some merit because CV is by definition a hypothetical 
approach, with hypothetical markets, a hypothetical provisioning of commodities and 
hypothetical payments. As Hayek (1975) had already explained for the related case of 
collectivist economic planning, individuals cannot articulate their preference independent 
of the context for action that the market place supplies. The difference between 
hypothetical statements of value and those that are obtained when real economic 
commitments would have to be made can never be known. Hypothetical bias is not the 
only weakness of CV, however. 
Second, there is a set of criticisms directed at the assumption underlying survey 
methodologies that coherent preferences on policy issues are susceptible to valuation and 
extractable through interviews or questionnaires. However, uncertainty, the novelty of 
the survey situation, question construction, and phrasing often make public opinion on 
policy issues unintelligible if not misleading. Once a particular machinery for making 
social choices from individual tastes is established it might be in the individual's strategic 
interest not to reveal her real preferences (Neumann and Morgenstern 1947). To borrow 
a well known example from another sub-field of political science, once a society has 
established a first-past-the post electoral system, citizens are likely to vote for the less 
desirable major party candidate instead of the minor party candidate they really favor. 
Underestimating the methodological difficulty of encoding such context-laden statements 
is therefore difficult, and CV could not possibly do justice to policy proposals aiming to 
launder them. 
Third, the deficiencies of applying CV to economic decision making points to the 
more fundamental issue whether public policy should be sensitive to preference 
satisfaction at all - no matter whether hypothetically stated or actually revealed in a 
market (Sagoff 1988). CBA functions on the basis that an allocation of resources is 
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preferable if people's preferences are better met. This view is founded on the economic 
assumptions inherent in consumer choice theory that, first, an individual consistently 
knows what she needs (usually referred to as the 'rationality' ideal), and, second, that her 
well-being depends on her subjective sense of satisfaction, which is best achieved by 
letting her preference determine the use of a society's resources (the 'consumer 
sovereignty' ideal). It is then possible to define an economic function for that individual 
such that the benefit of an alternative is greater than other alternatives over which it is 
preferred. These assumptions underpin not only the branch of economics, usually 
referred to as ‘normative welfare economics’, that we are concerned with in this chapter. 
But general economic theory, too, has relied on these assumptions to explain why the 
autonomous consumer acting in the free market is a better judge of her utility than a 
central planner. These assumptions have allowed practitioners and theorists in the field 
to derive the shape of demand curves and explain the efficient functioning of the market 
(Samuelson 1948; Lipsey and Christal 1999). 
Scholars critical of the idea's moral credentials have attacked the naïve form of 
subjectivism inherent in the theory, which conceals well known facts about human 
nature: that the psychological mechanisms by which social causes are transformed into
beliefs and preferences let individuals adjust their aspirations to their perceptions of 
possibilities, giving rise to the phenomenon of 'adaptive preference formation' (Elster 
1983); that they might be malformed so that their satisfaction will inflict harm on 
themselves (the heroin addict; the gambler) or others (the murderer) and should 
therefore not be accepted as legitimate input into economic evaluations (Sen 1987); that 
preference satisfaction fails to accord the proper moral status to those beings – both 
human (e.g. children) and non-human (e.g. animals) that are incapable of expressing a 
preference; that people wrongly predict the effects of their own choices on their future 
well-being (Kahneman 2003); and that, finally, preference satisfaction endorses individual 
choice based on errors, ignorance or misinformation, as it is incapable of distinguishing 
them from those based on knowledge. 
Consumers are, then, not always the best judges of their preferences, and WTP is 
a poor proxy for market prices: Policies should not always satisfy what respondents have 
stated as preferences at the outset. To Richardson (2001), these phenomena are 
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understandable and can be attributed to consumers' 'incomplete thinking'. As consumers' 
experience grows, 'practical intelligence' allows them to continue deliberating about the 
pros and cons of policy options. They then expectedly overturn their preferences in light 
of new and better information, a fact about human nature that economic tools such as 
CBA are incapable of factoring in. 
To be sure, some economists have concerns about the morally questionable 
results produced by the equal treatment of uninformed or malevolent preferences in their 
models. Yet they have failed to command widespread assent in the discipline. Mishan's 
standard textbook, for example, seems to be unsure whether, or how, questionable 
preferences should be treated (Mishan 1972, 386-8). These preferences are 
methodologically too meddlesome to deal with. As a minimum he is prepared to exclude 
from economic evaluations states of mind such as 'envy' or mere 'dislike'. Yet, as Rhoads 
(1999, ch. 9) shows, even that concession is not accepted among the majority of 
economists, who insist that no principle or law should constrain consumers' will and 
sovereignty.
Fourth, the valuation of nature begs the more fundamental and therefore rather 
well rehearsed question how to understand the concept of value in the first place. 
Assigning a value to nature requires the appraisal of fundamental philosophical issues 
about the role of economic value and human well-being. Economics and the market 
system, as the basis from which costs and benefits are imputed, are cultural phenomena 
that reflect just one way of perceiving the world, which is not necessarily shared by all. 
Nature can also be attributed what Krutilla (1967) has called 'existence value' whereby the 
survival of species itself is deemed to be worth protecting. Often, that value cannot be 
priced in real or hypothetical markets because the expected benefits do not accrue to 
those who might be asked to reveal or state a WTP for their preference. Respondents 
would have to perform the difficult conceptual exercise to determine the residual value 
of a good that they never have used and never will be using. Existence value is therefore 
not intelligibly assessed by either WTP, CV or markets.
Fifth, even if we cast aside the debate about existence value and assume that 
human well-being is accepted as the determining objective of valuation, it is still not clear 
that market prices indicate or reveal anything about the contribution they make to that 
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goal in a substantive sense. As the 18th century economist Adam Smith (1979) remarked 
with his ‘water-diamond paradox’, the term 'value' has two distinct meanings: sometimes 
it expresses the utility of some particular object, at other times the power of purchasing 
other goods which the possession of that object conveys. He called the former ‘value in 
use’ and the latter ‘value in exchange’ and observed that the things which have the 
greatest value in use (water) have frequently little or no value in exchange; and, 
conversely, those that have the greatest value in exchange (diamonds) have frequently 
little or no value in use. Exchange value bears no necessary connection to value in use. 
Yet, while the latter produces the benefit to individuals and thus augments society's well-
being, it is the former that is used to impute values into economic evaluations such as 
CBA or, at the most aggregate level, into a nation's gross domestic product (GDP). 
It did not take long for economists to develop 'marginalism' as an attempt to 
resolve the paradox: as water is not very costly to acquire and therefore consumed at 
high volumes (at least in developed economies), the marginal use value we obtain from
an additional bottle is rather low; and so is the exchange value, the price, we are willing to 
pay for it. The exchange value of diamonds, in turn, is high due to the good's scarcity and 
the comparatively higher marginal cost an increase in its supply incurs. We consume 
diamonds at low volumes as a result and are afforded a high marginal use value for every 
additional unit we consume. Hence, exchange value and use value are, it is said, identical, 
provided we assess both at the margin and not in total. For the total value of water is, so 
the argument concludes, of course very high when a large volume of it is consumed, 
while the total value received from diamonds is relatively low when few diamonds are 
consumed. 
This argument does not hold up to rigid scrutiny, however, as marginalism seems 
an odd concept to apply to many goods we use in daily life. The value (in affording 
happiness and contentment) of a teddy bear to a child, for example, or that of a wedding 
ring to its bearer cannot be adequately expressed by the exchange value that these items 
command in retail. Their use value is not meaningfully assessed through reference to the 
scarcity of teddy bears or the marginal value that a second or third ring might provide. 
For the particular case of environmental goods the additional problem presents itself that 
they are, for the most part, not traded in markets at all. There is no exchange value for 
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the air that we breath or the solar energy that heats our planet, although both are 
required for our survival and are therefore of high use value to us. They are, in fact, so-
called ‘essential goods’: the demand for air, water, and the sun is never zero, even at 
extreme prices. Under essentiality the maximum value in use of one additional unit of 
these goods is equal to total income, an assessment that is not true for most other goods 
that are used in the production process. It is therefore misleading to treat them in the 
same way as other goods. Hence, while exchange value and use value at the margin might 
be synonymous for some goods, they are not so for others, including those provided by 
nature.
In concluding this section, we should acknowledge, then, that the economic value 
of some goods cannot be ascertained; that for those goods for which valuation is 
possible economic value might not be a correct indicator for preference satisfaction or 
well-being; and that, even if it was, preferences are not always a suitable basis for public 
policy. The undermining of these assumptions calls into question the tools economists 
use to study efficiency. Conventional economic valuation is deficient and in need of 
improvement, or replacement, by a model that better reflects the interaction between the 
economy and the physical and biological world. Some important work has still to be 
done. At this point in time, policy makers need to be aware of the limits of the valuation 
of costs and benefits. Before we indicate some ways out of this impasse in the 
conclusion, a second issue area is worth being carved out. 
III. THE COMMENSURABILITY PROBLEM
Once attributes of well-being have been valued in the way discussed above, policy 
makers have to compound these attributes into a single aggregated standard so to decide 
who in a society should be given scarce resources. To do so, various attributes of 
individual well-being need to be commensurate across lives so that an increase in well-
being for individual A can be weighed against the foregone improvement individual B 
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would have experienced. This next phase in public decision making, however, gives rise 
to various issues that we will draw out against the background of healthcare as the 
second policy domain that governments tend to subject to economic evaluations. 
The provision of healthcare is an activity different to other policy domains on 
many levels, with important ramifications for the applicability of economic evaluations. 
Individuals do not willingly enter the healthcare market as they do for other services that 
governments might provide. Nor do they know when they will be in need of healthcare 
or what form of healthcare they will then require (Arrow 1963). As patients rarely have 
experience from previous purchases of healthcare, these decisions are, in general, not 
made by the consumer either but by a doctor. The doctor is also seen to be better 
equipped to calculate the many probability terms involved in alternative treatments. In 
economic parlance, she acts for the patient as an agent, a special relationship that creates 
two important dissociations.
First, the consumer becomes dissociated from the market. Healthcare services are 
sought after not based on preferences of the consumer alone, as indifference map 
demand theory in economics would assume, but they are either split or based solely on 
those of the agent (Mooney 1992, 67-82). Price formation theory, too, is repudiated as 
the consumer is rarely able to make a rational, informed choice in the market. He has 
only little information about the level of benefit or well-being various healthcare services 
and medical treatments might provide. These information asymmetries might be brought 
about consciously - by the doctor withholding information from his patient or, vice 
versa, by the patient concealing the true nature of her illness - or are merely due to the 
highly specialized knowledge required to understand the causes and effects of illnesses. 
The claim that consumers seek healthcare is therefore misleading too: individuals do not 
seek healthcare. Rather their goal is health. This is an important distinction: while 
healthcare resources are consumed by medical personnel, it is the patient who 
experiences the anticipated improvements in health and welfare that the resource 
consumption promises.
Second, the government as financial supplier becomes dissociated from the 
market also. Doctors as street-level providers possess significant discretion over the 
healthcare resources that governments have to pay for. Policy makers have therefore only 
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limited possibilities to control the expenditure for these services. In an effort to regain 
that control some governments have attempted to challenge, with various degrees of 
success, the clinical autonomy of doctors through the creation of internal markets and 
other measures inspired by the New Public Management approach.
Shortcomings in economic assumptions notwithstanding, economic evaluations 
in healthcare provision are more in demand than ever before, greatly spurred by the ever-
growing share of GDP that is absorbed by the treatment of nations' aging populations. 
Carrying out CBAs in such policy contexts promises guidance for decision makers as to 
the optimal distribution of medical manpower, R&D funding, reimbursement practices, 
capital controls, and safety regulations. Costs and benefits accrue at three different 
points, or channels, where healthcare is provided: cure (to improve health), care (to retain 
dignity for those who are sick), and prevention (to reduce the probability of illness or 
premature death). The benefits in these channels are established by valuing the respective 
effects a policy has on the state of health of the individual(s) in question. The methods 
used to conduct this activity have attracted their own set of criticism. They are similar to 
the charges elucidated in section II above and will therefore not be rehearsed here. 
Rather, we direct our attention to a related issue, the aggregation of attributes of 
well-being, which represents itself as soon as health improvements have been valued. 
Aggregation is a task not confined to healthcare but is pursued in all policy domains and 
for all goods and services that governments provide. Aggregation needs to be done over 
different outcomes of varied interventions undertaken on different problems. Staying 
with health care as a policy domain, for life threatening diseases such as coronary bypass 
surgery or tetanus the primary outcome will obviously be defined as death or survival. 
Case fatality rate and survival rate may in such cases be good indicators of the 
achievements of heath care reached. Each survival can then be indexed with the value 1 
and each fatality with 0. Treatment of most other illnesses - or, for that matter, effects of 
other policy decisions on well-being - does not result in such binary outcomes however, 
and measuring them in such a way means that everyone who survives a medical 
intervention is given the same value, no matter if the person is confined to bed or is 
actively able to play sports. A more accurate measure would be required for these cases, 
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one that is able to capture benefits in form of subsequent grades of well-being between 
the two end points of the spectrum. 
In a move to develop an adequate methodology to develop such an index, 
scholars began, from the 1970s onwards, to define health in terms of 'utility of life' 
(Torrance et al. 1972; Zeckhauser and Shephard 1976). Three decades of research and 
numerous refinements later, utility of life has come to be calculated along two 
dimensions: (a) the duration of life as measured in life years and (b) the quality of life as 
experienced by the individual's physical, social and emotional functioning. The latter is 
elicited via patient questionnaires and interviews, where rating scale, time trade-off or 
standard gambling techniques (of which more will be heard in a moment) are applied 
across a multitude of domains - including mobility, emotion, cognition and pain - so to 
arrive at the weighted preference that each domain commands (Drummond et al. 1997, 
150-83). The greater the preference for a particular health state, the greater the 'utility' 
associated with it. Utilities of health states are generally expressed on a numerical scale 
ranging from 0 to 1, in which 0 represents the utility of the state 'dead' and 1 the utility of 
a state lived in 'perfect health'. Finally, utilities are multiplied by the remainder of an 
individual's lifetime for each outcome to calculate so-called 'Quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs)'. The QALY benefit associated with any given intervention is calculated as the 
difference between the QALYs available with that intervention and the QALYs available 
without that intervention. The results can then be used to create 'cost-per-QALY' 
rankings for different interventions which aids in deciding on 'best-buy' strategies, and to 
develop statistics on 'Disability-adjusted life-year expectancies (DALYs)' across countries 
(WHO 2000, 176-83; Murray 1996). 
The QALYs approach is an exercise in what is commonly called 'multi criteria 
mapping' and thus akin to methods developed to address aggregation issues in other 
policy domains. It soon established itself as the most sophisticated and therefore default 
methodology for measuring and aggregating individual levels of human well-being in 
general and quality of life in healthcare in particular. In no other policy sector has there 
been developed a similarly refined approach. And as a non-monetary standard it has the 
added benefit of bypassing the criticisms about monetary valuation that we elaborated 
upon in the previous section. 
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Despite the advantages of using a single indicator to measure the effectiveness of 
health-care interventions, QALYs have been widely criticised on ethical, conceptual and 
operational grounds, casting doubts on whether the underlying methodology actually 
solves the problem of incommensurability. The possibility of combining quantity and 
quality of life in a single index is rooted in the school of political philosophy known as 
utilitarianism. It is the foundation for the economic analysis of individual behaviour and 
has emerged in the works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in the 18th and 19th
century respectively. Now known as the 'interpersonal comparison of well-being' 
problem, it has kept philosophers on their toes ever since (Elster and Roemer 1991).4
Bentham's intention was to provide the British parliament with a political theory that
could be used to construct sound and rational policies rather than letting them rely on 
vague and biased intuitions. The theory's main prescription was to enact laws that are 
dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to 
augment the utility (or 'happiness' as Bentham called it) of the community is greater than 
any which it has to diminish (Bentham 1970). In what became later known as classical 
utilitarianism, this principle directs the policy maker to maximize the utility of the 
members of a society.
Utilitarian theory has been persistently attractive to generations of policy makers 
and political theorists because of its simplicity; its scientific allure as a theory that can be 
written down as a mathematical formula; and its concern for human welfare as the core 
of moral philosophy. Yet it has also attracted its fair share of criticism, resulting in many 
authors proposing modifications and re-definitions to make the theory more palatable. 
This is certainly not the place to rehearse this debate. The reader may refer to the 
extensive research produced on the topic, with the collection edited, for example, by 
Glover (1990) providing a good starting point. Sen (1987, 39) is more useful for us in 
that he has drawn out the elementary requirements of any utilitarian moral principle. 
These are (1) welfarism, requiring that the goodness of a state of affairs be a function 
only of the utility information regarding that state; (2) sum-ranking, requiring that utility 
information regarding any state be assessed by looking only at the sum-total of all the 
utilities in that state; and (3) consequentialism, requiring that every choice, whether of 
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actions, institutions, motivations, rules etc., be ultimately determined by the goodness of
the consequent state of affairs. 
Note that the first requirement about welfarism can only be made to work if 
individuals are assumed to be able to evaluate their utility; if that utility can be made 
known to interested third parties, such as policy makers, through some sort of valuation; 
and if that valuation can be measured in quantitative terms. These assumptions have 
already been questioned in section II when we discussed the case of environmental 
goods. It is the second requirement on sum-ranking which we are concerned with in the 
current context of aggregation of utilities and QALYs. Bentham insisted that sum-
ranking is possible because, to him, the item to be aggregated (happiness) denoted only 
one type of experience (the feeling of pleasure). Hence, utility was, in his view, easily 
aggregated across lives, for it was only one, not multiple, experiences that people would 
encounter. It didn't take long before philosophers objected that some pleasures differ in 
kind according to the value individuals attach to them. And these are not the same across 
lives.5
Given the multiplicity of states of health that individuals might experience, the 
question then remains whether it is possible to know how much healthier some are 
compared to others. We are certainly able to make such a comparison in an ordinal sense, 
e.g. I can stipulate that I feel better than someone who is in great physical pain. However, 
to compare utilities across lives, I need to be able to make the comparison in a cardinal 
sense, i.e. I need to know exactly how much better I am. Cardinality, in turn, implies two 
requirements that need to be satisfied (Bossert 1991): (1) a number must be attached to 
the outcome that represents the strength of the preference relative to others, so that a 
health state of, say, 0.6 is three times better than one of 0.2; and (2) the scale must have 
an equal interval property where equal differences at different points along the response 
scale are equally meaningful, so that boosting a patient from, say, 0.1 to 0.2 on that scale 
is of equal benefit to raising someone from 0.8 to 0.9. 
Health scientists and policy makers have recently started to develop various 
preference elicitation techniques in an effort to calculate the required QALY weightings. 
Various psychological studies suggest that because of cognitive limitations in humans, the 
techniques do not always elicit responses that satisfy the two requirements. With the 
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rating scale approach, for example, individuals are asked to rank health outcomes from 
most preferred to least preferred and to place them on a scale such that the intervals 
between placements correspond to the differences in preference as perceived by the 
individual. However, psychologists have challenged the meaningfulness of the cardinal 
statements thus produced by respondents. As Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1997) argue, 
subjective impressions cannot be discriminated equally at each level of a scale. 
Individuals will attempt to use categories equally often and spread their responses when 
cases are actually close together (the 'spacing out' bias), or they compress them when the 
underlying attributes are actually far apart (the 'end-of-scale bias). 
The standard gamble, as a second method, induces the individual to choose 
between two alternatives: (a) no treatment at all which will result in a specified state of ill-
health, or (b) treatment that could result in either death or illness-free health, each with a 
probability of p and 1-p respectively. The probability is then varied until the respondent 
is indifferent between the two alternatives, thus producing the preference score sought 
after. Tversky et al. (1990), however, have shown through various laboratory experiments 
that individuals have the tendency to reverse previously revealed preferences. They might 
use inappropriate psychological representations and simplifying heuristics that misdirect 
their decisions. Psychologists have attributed this phenomenon to the serial way by 
which individuals process information: they use an anchoring technique for the first piece 
of information and then gradually adjust their decision making with each additional piece 
of information they obtain. 
Finally, the time trade-off presents individuals with a choice of living for a 
defined amount of time in perfect health or a variable amount of time in an alternative 
state that is less desirable. The time is varied until the respondent is indifferent between 
the two alternatives. The method's application, however, has found patients to prefer, for 
example, immediate death to being in a state of mild dysfunction for three months. This 
suggests that individuals misunderstand the nature of the trade-off, reducing the 
meaningfulness of the results on a utility scale that ranges between 0 and 1. 
Patients' responses as well as the metric underlying their measurement cannot, 
then, be standardized across individuals. Epistemological difficulties remain when adding 
up or comparing subjective levels of satisfaction that the consumption of goods gives to 
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individuals (Nord 1999). The preference elicitation techniques used with the QALY 
approach encounter too many teething problems that prevent policy makers to uncover 
stable and consistent preferences revealing true commensurate valuations. Notably, the 
failure to make attributes of well-being commensurate does not mean that comparisons 
are futile exercises. Incommensurability does not deny the possibility of comparisons of 
course. Neither does it need to be inconsistent with fundamental assumptions in decision 
theory: reason-guided choice is still possible even without commensurability, as the data 
underlying QALYs are still useful to make more simple comparisons through ordinal 
rankings (Sunstein 1997, 39). Yet, they lack the precision that is required to impute them 
into economic methodologies such as CBA. 
More exchange between psychologists, economists and philosophers seems 
necessary. For the case of health care in the UK, for example, the National Center for 
Research Methodology (NCRM) and the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) have recently commissioned joint research projects with the aim of determining 
the societal value of a QALY.6 This project addresses, among other issues, the 
conceptual link between a QALY and an individual's WTP as well as the relative value of 
health gains to different beneficiaries, according to personal attributes such as age, 
education, and geography. These initiatives could shed more light on the problem at 
hand. Until solutions are developed from those (and other) findings, however, the 
second requirement on sum ranking that Sen specified for utilitarian theory remains 
unsatisfied. 
To be sure, as Kymlicka (2001, 18) rightly reminds us, in daily life practical 
reasoning constantly requires us to make decisions about how to balance different kinds 
of goods that are incommensurable, by simply judging what is better or worse overall. 
While we might go along with his assessment for the individual decisions we make in our 
personal lives, we believe it is an ill-advised position to take for the analysis of public 
policy. The economic evaluation techniques used to arrive at policy decisions differ in 
their level of complexity from the balancing acts between the comparatively few personal 
values that inform our individual choices. We can revisit and re-assess the ordinal 
rankings we have made in a personal choice situation at any given time. Economic 
evaluation techniques, by contrast, balance many more preferences and values that are 
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held by markedly more individuals and eventually produce only one (usually quantitative) 
recommendation. From that moment on, they conceal the complex weighing process 
between the different cardinal attributes that had been imputed beforehand. 
Admittedly, for evaluation techniques to work the imputed preferences and 
values need to be made explicit in the first place, which is an approach preferable to 
making policy choices on the basis of decision makers’ implicit (and therefore concealed) 
assumptions and preferences. Yet, once all of the relevant goods are aligned along a 
single metric, they are no longer visible, or perhaps become invisible (Sunstein 1997, 50). 
People can no longer make judgements based on qualitative differences. Hence, if we 
want the policy recommendation to be meaningful and accurate we need to ensure that 
the numerical values imputed into the analysis at the outset have been compared and 
aggregated accurately. This does demonstrably not always hold true, in which case the 
policy choice needs to be made through alternative measures. Some of these we will 
present in the conclusion below.
IV. THE INTRINSIC VALUE PROBLEM
At the end of section II we introduced the concepts of 'existence value', 'exchange value' 
and 'use value' to our discussion. We defined existence value as a value that a good can 
have independent of the effects it produces for human well-being, such as the survival of 
species. We also contended that exchange value, as the metric that is imputed into 
economic evaluations, bears no necessary connection to the value in use that produces 
the benefit to individuals and thus augments human well-being. 
There is a crucial link between these three concepts that merits further 
exploration: economic evaluations impose a unitary standard (usually money) on the 
valuation and comparison of goods and thus subordinate both existence value and use 
value to the new standard of exchange value. While we have already drawn out some 
aspects of this relationship for objects (i.e. environmental goods in section II and 
healthcare services in section III), we will, in this section, develop that point in more 
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detail for subjects. We will argue that the intrinsic value of human beings (as the 
equivalent to the existence value of objects) is crowded out by economic evaluations. 
To understand why, let us assume that, in some distant future, the problem of 
valuation and aggregation expounded earlier will have been solved and that it is therefore 
possible to evaluate policy programs according to the extent to which they maximize 
benefits to society. Now consider the following simplified case borrowed from Harris 
(1975): a hospital has admitted four patients who are all bound to die if no suitable organ 
donor is soon to be found. The next morning, the postman enters the building to deliver 
his daily load of letters and parcels. From previous conversations the nurse recalls that he 
would be a suitable donor for all four patients. As a possible route of action she could 
now kill him, harvest his organs and thus enable the four patients to survive. If numbers 
count and we conduct a simple CBA we would have to conclude that sacrificing the 
postman is the superior alternative: four lives are more valuable than one and the highest 
aggregate level of welfare is achieved if the postman dies and the four patients live. 
Most of us would consider this option as objectionable of course. In most 
contexts it strikes us intuitively as unfair if a few may be sacrificed for the benefit of the 
greater good of the many. Yet, given the economic rationale of benefit maximization it is 
justifiable, if not mandatory, to proceed that way. The problem we encounter here is 
caused by the formally equal way by which these evaluations treat human beings: every 
individual counts as one and can thus be added up to, or traded against, somebody else. 
This observation is akin to the phenomenon of 'commodification' originally developed 
by Karl Marx (1964, 96-105). In capitalist societies, so Marx argued, the mode of 
production comes under private ownership, commodity production proliferates, and 
labor division becomes increasingly fragmented. Forced to sell their labor power to 
survive, workers themselves become akin to a commodity and are reduced from the 
status of a qualitative individual to mere exchange value in the form of labor. Where once 
the goal of production was the simple satisfaction of needs, and exchange was driven 
through the need for the other's use value, capitalism eliminates individual exchange. It 
subordinates use value to exchange value and establishes exchange value as an 
independent logic. In the extreme but quite common form of trading stocks, for 
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example, there is no longer a physical referent at all: money is made out of money with 
no apparent connection to the world of real commodities.
The reduction of human beings to a number - either expressed as a simple unit as 
in the organ donor case or as a monetary WTP value attached to their preferences -
assumes equivalence between attributes of persons and thus dissolves their qualitative 
differences into the identity of a single quantitative metric. Such a metric might in general 
solve the problem of aggregation (how to compare levels of well-being), and the 
monetary metric as exchange value in particular might solve the problem of exchange 
(how to trade qualitatively unique goods in equal quantitative ratios), but it transforms 
subjects into abstract entities that are deprived of their unique characteristics. 
One such characteristic is that each individual has intrinsic value: we have an 
interest in our own continued existence and cannot be used solely as a means for 
assisting other individuals as ends in themselves. Intrinsic values are non-relational: they 
are not defined relative to some other human being, species, or object, nor to the benefit 
it might provide to them. My intrinsic value is the value I have in and of myself, beyond 
any value I might have as a means to further ends. I am therefore to be respected as a 
rights-bearer proper, as an end in myself. Rights are principles that assign claims or 
entitlements to someone against someone, and are usually interpreted as "trumping" 
consequential claims made in the name of welfare (Dworkin 1977). That means that I 
should never be treated in certain ways, even if the calculation of aggregated individual 
well-being shows that the action which has these effects would be the most beneficial 
one overall. 
Reducing individuals to a monetary metric might change the way we perceive 
their value to us. Margaret Jane Radin (1996) illustrates the implications for the trade in 
'commodities' such as sex, children, and body parts and observes that there are not only 
willing buyers for such commodities but some desperately poor people are willing sellers, 
too. To her, this reflects a persistent dilemma in liberal societies: freedom of choice is 
valued but, at the same time, choices ought to be restricted to protect the integrity of 
what it means to be a person. She views this tension as primarily the result of underlying 
social and economic inequalities, which need not reflect an irreconcilable conflict in the 
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premises of liberal democracy but a mere setting of the right priorities in distributive 
policy choices.
Political philosophy has therefore sought to embed intrinsic value and individual 
rights into some concept of justice, such as a (Neo-)Kantian imperative to treat others 
fairly or Locke's view that people have the right to be protected against the breaches of 
their rights by the actions of others. Even utilitarians like Mill have endorsed rights and 
intrinsic values as a possible strategy to maximize utility. Such a position is known as rule 
utilitarianism, in contrast to act utilitarianism which is the view Bentham originally 
suggested. It postulates that the principle of utility can yield a notion of 'rights' if we 
appreciate the way a person's rights are defined by rules regarding the treatment of 
human beings that are by and large utility maximizing.
This is no place to develop the pros and cons of any of these concepts. It is 
important to note, however, that, while constraining economic evaluations through 
intrinsic values and individual rights can be attractive to a great variety of traditionally 
juxtaposed theories of morality, the resulting consensus in political philosophy cannot be 
transferred easily to public policy formation or economic evaluation techniques. This 
follows because, to follow Ruth Chang's (1997, 5-23) helpful distinction, intrinsic values 
give rise to the problem of ordinal incomparability. The reader might recall from section 
III that we concluded that attributes of well-being are incommensurable across lives, i.e. 
that they cannot be compared cardinally for the purpose of aggregation, but that at least 
ordinal comparisons are available as a basis for rational choice. We now encounter the 
more severe case where the relevant imputations for the analysis are not even 
comparable in that latter sense. 
This follows because the practical role of intrinsic values is neither to prescribe 
an end to be maximized nor to prescribe an attitude toward an aggregate. As such there 
are multiple ways in which we can sharpen our understanding of a person's intrinsic 
value, such as by love, respect, honor, or admiration. In some cases one understanding 
might be privileged while in another it isn't. This vagueness disallows for any strand of 
the usual trichotomy of comparison (‘better than’, ‘worse than’, ‘equally good as’) to hold, 
which applies to comparisons between intrinsic values themselves as much as between 
them and other quantifiable values. 
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While incomparability might be less of a problem for clear-cut cases such as the 
life-or-death choices to be made in the organ transplant scenario mentioned earlier, other 
policy decisions are more clearly subject to this limitation. Health care, to stay in the 
same policy domain, does not only suffer from a lack of organs for example. Hospital 
beds, technical equipment, and medical personnel, too, are scarce resources that can be 
distributed among patients in different ways. Economic evaluations would recommend 
that these should be used less intensively for the care of acute or incurable patients as 
they require far more of them than does the care of convalescing patients. Similarly, 
applying the QALY approach explicated in section III to the optional treatment of either 
an elderly person or a young child would result in the preference to be given to the latter, 
because QALY scores are particularly high for those who still have many years to live 
and therefore have a greater 'capacity to benefit'. Economic evaluations applied in an 
unconstrained way would therefore lead to the marginalization of the incurable, 
chronically ill, or the elderly. They would override individuals' intrinsic value in terms of 
their dignity and, possibly, their right to live.
To be sure, in some contexts an intelligible response that bypasses the intrinsic 
value problem is possible. The application of distributional weights, for example, can go 
a long way to ensure an equitable distribution of scarce resources that does not neglect 
groups who are in need (Layard and Walters 2001). However, while the existence of a 
tangible criterion to define disadvantage allows us to identify some such groups – e.g. 
income levels as an indicator that demarcates the needy poor from the non-needy rich –
other groups which we deem worthy of special consideration, and would ideally want to 
apply appropriate distributional weights to, are less lucidly identified. How, for example, 
should we weigh the feelings of love, respect, honor or admiration by which we grant a 
person her intrinsic value? How do we gauge the underlying psychological processes? 
Our choice between these feelings does not proceed on some measurable comparison 
but on the more intangible principle of obligation. 
Intrinsic values cannot be ranked ordinally in a meaningful way then. There is no 
way to incorporate them into any type of evaluation. The policy maker is thus faced with 
a situation in which he can choose to either (1) ignore the intrinsic value, or to (2) admit 
it as a constraint and reject the policy recommendation under review. The former will 
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then judge the recommendation to be permissible whereas on the latter it is 
impermissible. Judging the policy as impermissible, in turn, implies that any benefits 
which would result from rights-incompatible actions must be excluded from the action 
decision altogether. It places limits on what would otherwise be the implication of 
aggregative economic evaluations and restricts governmental action. 
This is, of course, not a satisfying conclusion to arrive at because our following 
option 2 puts the whole exercise of economic evaluation into question in the first place 
while under option 1 intrinsic values are crowded out and ‘forgotten’ by the imperative 
of identifying, collecting, measuring and aggregating other values that are comparable. 
Two alternative and somewhat juxtaposed approaches to the dilemma seem to be on 
offer both of which, however, require further refinement and specification if they are to 
provide meaningful solutions. 
There is, first, the suggestion made by Schrader-Frachette (1991, ch. 11) that each 
group affected by a proposed policy program should conduct their own economic 
evaluation as an intermediate stage of a more extensive process of participative justice. 
This approach would not only allow for a separate assessment of intrinsic values and a 
weighing of their merits. It would also reflect different methodological, ethical and social 
assumptions and thus portray all sides of a given story. The end result would then likely 
to be an evaluation with a multidimensional array of benefits and costs. Alternatively, we 
might want to embrace the work begun by Scanlon (1991) on the compatibility of the 
ethical and economic conception of value that individuals attach to human well-being. 
Instead of granting various stakeholder groups to carry out multiple evaluations that are 
later democratically deliberated upon, Scanlon suggests a single common index, a shared 
conception between philosophers and economists of things good and bad in life. These 
would not only consist of exchangeable goods but which could also refer to other levels 
of development and states of consciousness. If developed further, as suggested by Kopp 
(1993), to clarify who should determine which goods and conditions for a good life make 
it onto that index, this line of thought could indeed result in a more complete economic 
theory. 
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CONCLUSION
In each of the previous three sections we have outlined an issue area that decision 
makers need to be aware of when devising public policy that is based on economic 
evaluations such as CBA. That awareness is not equally called for in all policy domains, as 
policy decisions in some domains are less vulnerable to our criticisms than in others. It 
remains up to the judgment of the reader to assess the relevance of the three issue areas 
and, possibly, conclude that CBA can be applied unequivocally to help solve a given 
policy problem. When decisions have to be made in domains such as those referred to in 
this chapter, however, policy makers are advised to consider other methodological 
approaches that bypass the pitfalls identified. To that end we offer below two alternative 
approaches. They are not fundamentally new evaluation techniques but are best seen as 
less stringent variants of CBA and should therefore be easily comprehensible.
In section II we saw that not all costs and benefits that enter economic 
evaluations can be measured in monetary terms, as some valuation techniques rest on 
contestable assumptions regarding the quantification of economic value. As a possible 
way out of this impasse, the policy maker could replace CBA with a similar technique, 
that of cost-utility analysis (CUA). The difference is that, while CBA converts benefits 
into a monetary metric as a common unit, CUA expresses benefits in terms of the utility 
it provides to the individual - such as QALYs in the case of health care. It is a non-
monetary concept for estimating the value to society of improvements in a status of well-
being and thus side-steps the problem of monetary conversion. 
Its merits as a non-monetary economic evaluation technique notwithstanding, 
CUA remains, just as CBA is, vulnerable to the criticisms we raised in section II and III: 
calculating utility ratings by quizzing individuals for their preferences of well-being is 
contestable because these preferences might be non-authentic, malformed, strategically 
motivated or simply uninformed. And individuals differ - across lives and across stages of 
their own life - in how they value particular states of well-being. Any attempt to aggregate 
such incommensurable attributes into a single standard brings about methodological as 
well as ethical issues. 
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To cater to these objections, cost-effectiveness analysis, or CEA, recommends 
itself as yet another evaluation technique. Both CBA/CUA as well as CEA are formal 
methods for comparing the benefits and costs of a policy program. The difference is that, 
while CBA and CUA convert these benefits into monetary value and utility respectively 
as a common unit, CEA expresses benefits as such, i.e. in terms of a natural unit as some 
standard of outcome. In the case of healthcare such an outcome could, for example, 
constitute the incremental reduction in mortality rate or the increase in the number of 
immunizations delivered, rather than the monetary value or utility that CBA/CUA would 
calculate for each of these effects. In the case of environmental regulation an outcome 
could, for example, constitute the level of air quality as measured by the ambient ozone 
level, rather than the economic value or utility it provides to humanity. CEA thus side-
steps the problem of monetary conversion as found in CBA and the problem of 
preference satisfaction and utility aggregation as found in CUA. 
The detour comes at a price, however, because CEA is a much less powerful tool 
than CBA or CUA. It can only assess alternative policies where costs relate to a single 
common effect as measured on a natural scale (such as mortality rate) which may differ 
in magnitude among the policy options evaluated. It can then be used to choose among 
those options in terms of their effectiveness-to-cost ratio. Conversely, if the budget is 
predetermined, that is the costs are 'fixed', it can, again, only be used to compare various 
policy options as to their rate of attaining that non-quantified goal, such as decreasing 
mortality. What it cannot do is to give an indication how much should be spent to 
achieve a policy outcome. Neither can CEA give guidance whether a policy intervention 
is worth doing at all, for it tacitly assumes that the objective has been deemed worth 
meeting beforehand. It does therefore not specify how far a program's ratio of effects to 
costs can fall before it is no longer worth doing. To determine if resources have been 
allocated in such a way that benefits to society have been maximized is not possible with 
CEA.7
What neither CBA, CUA nor CEA can solve, however, is the intrinsic value 
problem that we addressed in section IV. Intrinsic values are not merely not 
commensurable, they are, more fundamentally, also not comparable with other benefits 
and costs. All too often, they are therefore 'forgotten' in economic evaluations although 
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they should be allowed to restrict the projects that government may permissibly carry 
out. In policy practice, such side constraints can be feasibly implemented by giving a veto 
power to the individuals impacted by the proposed policy. It does not follow, of course, 
that such rights automatically override any possible net benefits of a proposed policy, but 
neither are they morally irrelevant. 
In concluding, economic tools are very general techniques that have very 
stringent information requirements not all of which can always be met. They can 
therefore not function as a fundamental standard of choice among policy options. This is 
not a reason to reject economic evaluations per se as they do provide us with information 
that is morally relevant and thus possibly uncovers hitherto concealed judgments by 
policy makers eager to cater to special interests. It is, we have argued, both unethical and 
irrational in general to ignore the cost and benefits of a pending policy decision. Yet, it is 
a reason to acknowledge that economic evaluations should be understood as an input 
into, rather than a substitute for, political deliberation and judgment (Sunstein 2002). Not 
all situations call on us to maximize value. Some simply compel us to respect it. 
Economic evaluations should be seen as a useful heuristic to raise red flags about policy 
proposals and identify the economic factors involved. Whether economic factors are, in 
fact, the dominant concern at all in a given situation is a judgment that will have to 
remain within the realm of responsibility of the policy maker.
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ENDNOTES
                                                
1 The authors are grateful to Donald Franklin, Bob Goodin, Michael Moran, Camilla 
Needham, Jesse Norman, Martin Reid, and Grant Venner for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. The research has been supported by AHRB Innovation Grant No. 
AR15635. 
2 The Gini-coefficient varies between the limits of 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect 
inequality) and is best understood as the geometrical divergence in a diagram between a 
45 degree line on the one hand, which represents perfect equality, and the Lorenz curve 
beneath it on the other, which measures percentage income distribution (as plotted on 
the y axis) across the percentage of the population (as plotted on the x axis).
3 In some (mostly US American) literature the method is also referred to as ‘benefit-cost 
analysis’.
4 We use 'utility' here interchangeably with the terms 'welfare' and 'well-being' as the 
satisfaction accruing to an individual from the consumption of a good or service. 
5 The utility concept as used by most economists and philosophers in the 19th and 20th
centuries is theoretically distinct from the utility used in the QALY methodology. The 
former describes decisions where goods are received with certainty, whereas the latter 
does so for probabilistic outcomes under uncertainty. Decision theory under uncertainty 
aspires to the more rigid requirements as stipulated by the so-called von Neumann 
Morgenstern utility theory (Neumann and Morgenstern 1947), whereas the conventional 
philosophical/economic understanding sees a utility merely as the satisfaction of 
preferences. For our discussion this is no relevant distinction, however: NM utilities 
cover decision making theory at the individual level only and cannot be used to compare 
welfare between individuals (Zeckhauser and Schefer 1975, 41; Drummond et al. 1997: 
150).
6 See www.publichealth.bham.ac.uk/nccrm/publications.htm for publications of future 
research results.
7 Note that some authors and literatures treat CUA as a particular case of CEA, or CEA 
and CUA as particular cases of CBA. The three techniques may therefore appear under 
different labels. 
